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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes the right of Parties to cooperate in the 
implementation of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) through both market- and 
non-market-based approaches. One market-based approach is outlined in Article 6.2 which 
provides for “the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes [(ITMOs)] towards” 
NDCs. This is widely seen as establishing a “bottom-up” approach, whereby “mitigation 
outcomes,” representing emission reduction credits, can be transferred internationally and then 
become ITMOs. It can be contrasted with other market-based approaches that are “top-down,” 
involving centralized programs supporting emission reduction projects. One such program is 
created in Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement which establishes a new “mechanism to contribute to 
the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development” (sustainable 
development mechanism or SDM).  
Under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, in making use of ITMOs, Parties must “promote 
sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity.” Similarly, under Article 6.4, the 
SDM is intended to “support” and “foster” sustainable development. While that phrase is not 
defined in the agreement, several Parties have argued that it requires the protection and promotion 
of human rights, consistent with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. That argument is 
supported by the recognition, in the preamble to the agreement, that Parties should “respect, 
promote, and consider their respective obligations on human rights” when taking action to address 
climate change. This creates an overarching expectation that Parties will, in implementing the 
agreement, take steps to protect human rights.  
This paper identifies, describes, and explores different approaches to ensuring human 
rights are protected in the context of Article 6. We consider, as one possible approach, whether and 
how social and environmental safeguards could be incorporated into the rules governing ITMOs 
and the SDM. We find that there is a compelling policy rationale for incorporating safeguards into 
both the ITMO and SDM frameworks, not only to prevent human rights abuses, but also to ensure 
the success of ITMO and SDM programs and projects. Safeguards minimize the risk of public 
opposition and other controversies that have, in the past, derailed individual projects and called 
entire programs into question.  
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While the above considerations suggest that safeguards should be incorporated into the 
Article 6 frameworks, the legal basis for doing so is somewhat uncertain, particularly in the context 
of the ITMO regime. This has implications for the scope, substance, and enforcement of the 
safeguards: 
 With respect to scope, Parties may choose to pursue: 
o a limited approach, whereby safeguards are developed only for the SDM, and embedded 
within the rules, procedures, and modalities adopted therefor; 
o a more comprehensive approach, whereby separate safeguards are developed for both the 
SDM and ITMO frameworks, and included in their respective governing rules; or 
o an integrated approach, whereby a single set of safeguards applying to both the SDM and 
ITMO frameworks are developed, perhaps in the Paris Implementation Guidelines. 
The limited approach is the most legally defensible and appears to have the greatest support 
among Parties to the Paris Agreement. There is, however, also some support for the second 
more comprehensive approach. That approach could be justified on the basis that both the 
SDM and ITMO frameworks are intended to promote sustainable development, which 
arguably requires the protection of human rights. The fact that both frameworks have the same 
goal, and are grouped together as “cooperative approaches” under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement, also supports the integrated approach. 
 With respect to substance, Parties should draw on experience with existing safeguard policies, 
utilized in connection with other similar mechanisms. The extent to which various policies are 
drawn on will likely depend, in part, on the scope of the safeguards developed under the Paris 
Agreement. In particular: 
o If safeguards are developed solely for the SDM, Parties should draw on the policies utilized 
in connection with the Clean Development Mechanism, the framework for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, and the various climate funds. 
o If safeguards are also developed for the ITMO framework, Parties may draw on the policies 
identified above, but should also consider those developed for other emissions trading 
schemes.   
 With respect to enforcement, various approaches may be taken, depending on the scope and 
substance of the safeguards. SDM-specific safeguards would likely be subject to centralized 
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enforcement, either by the governing body for the SDM or another entity designed by it. There 
is, however, greater uncertainty regarding the enforcement of any ITMO-specific safeguards. 
Possible options include: 
o centralized enforcement, whereby an international body (perhaps the SDM-governing 
body) would be responsible for certifying that projects comply with the safeguards; 
o national-level enforcement, whereby national governments would be responsible for 
certifying compliance, and there would be no international oversight; or  
o hybrid enforcement, whereby compliance certificates issued by national governments 
would be subject to review by an international body. 
In addition to analyzing the possible use of safeguards, we also consider other approaches 
to help protect and promote human rights in the implementation of Article 6. Specifically, we 
discuss how a rights-based approach could inform the rules governing the adaptation funding 
mechanism envisioned in Article 6.6, as well as the overarching implementation guidelines for the 
Paris Agreement. With respect these other approaches, we find that: 
 With regards to funding, we find that: 
o Article 6 expressly requires that a share of the proceeds from the SDM be used to fund 
adaptation projects in vulnerable countries. The Parties could adopt rules or guidance to 
ensure that these funds are invested in a manner that will best serve the purpose of 
protecting and promoting human rights. 
o Article 6 does not require that a share of the ITMO revenue be used for adaptation, but 
some Parties have nonetheless advocated for a similar funding requirement to be 
embedded within the ITMO guidelines, as applies to the SDM. While Article 6 could be 
interpreted expansively to permit the establishment of an ITMO funding requirement, it is 
unlikely that all Parties would agree to this. That said, the Parties could adopt non-binding 
guidance recommending that ITMO revenue be used to meet adaptation funding 
commitments or enter into a new agreement which establishes a requirement pertaining to 
ITMO revenue and adaptation funding. 
 With regards to the overarching implementation guidelines, we note that provisions pertaining 
to human rights could be incorporated into these guidelines – for example, requirements that 
countries report on how they are respecting and promoting human rights in the 
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implementation of Article 6 mechanisms. However, it is unlikely that such overarching 
guidelines would provide the same level of protection as more targeted rules aimed at 
safeguarding human rights in the context of Article 6 implementation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recognizing the need for action to address the “urgent threat of climate change,” in 
December 2015, the global community adopted the Paris Agreement.1 The Agreement aims to 
“strengthen the global response” to climate change, both by limiting future temperature increases, 
and enhancing countries’ ability to deal with the adverse effects of such increases.2 To that end, the 
Agreement urges countries to pursue “ambitious efforts” to mitigate and adapt to climate change, 
through both domestic and global-level action.3 At the same time, however, it acknowledges that 
such action may itself have adverse effects and must therefore be pursued with care.4  
Actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change are needed to protect human rights against 
threats associated with the impacts of climate change. But past experience with projects aimed at 
mitigating and adapting to climate change clearly demonstrates the potential for harm to local 
communities and the environment. One example is hydroelectric projects which, while delivering 
climate benefits in the form of clean energy, have also resulted in serious human rights abuses. The 
Paris Agreement is the first international environmental agreement to recognize the need to avoid 
such abuses, with the Parties acknowledging in the preamble that they:  
“should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote, and 
consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the 
rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons 
with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to 
development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and 
intergenerational equity.”5 
This statement creates an expectation that the Parties will take steps to safeguard human 
rights when implementing the Paris Agreement – not only by pursuing ambitious mitigation and 
                                                     
1 UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Adoption of the Paris 
Agreement, Decision 1/CP.21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
2 Paris Agreement, Art. 2.1. 
3 Id. at Art. 3. 
4 Id. at Premable (The Parties recognize that they “may be affected not only by climate 
change, but also by the impact of measures taken in response to it”). 
5 Id. at Preamble. 
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adaptation actions, but also by ensuring that the actions themselves do not interfere with the full 
enjoyment of human rights. Notably however, the need for human rights safeguards is not 
addressed in any of the substantive provisions of the Paris Agreement, leading to questions as to 
whether and how they will be incorporated. 
This paper explores the incorporation of human rights safeguards under Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement which provides for international cooperation on actions to mitigate climate 
change. The paper focuses on the two market-based “cooperative approaches” – one involving the 
use of “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs) representing emissions 
reduction credits and the other creating a new “sustainable development mechanism” (SDM) to 
support emissions reduction projects – identified in Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement. 
While neither article expressly references human rights, they both acknowledge the need for 
cooperative approaches to further “sustainable development,”6 which has been found to require 
the protection of rights. 7  Recognizing this, in their comments on how the articles should be 
operationalized, several Parties have recommended that human right safeguards be incorporated 
into the ITMO and SDM frameworks. This paper identifies, describes, and explores various ways 
in which that recommendation could be implemented. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Part 2 outlines the market-based 
mechanisms in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The relationship between those mechanisms and 
existing market-based emission reduction programs is then discussed in Part 3. Drawing on 
experience with the existing programs, Part 4 explores whether and how human rights safeguards 
can be incorporated into the Article 6 mechanisms, and what form any such safeguards should 
take. Part 5 then identifies other approaches to protecting and promoting human rights in the 
context of the Article 6 mechanisms. Part 6 concludes.  
                                                     
6 Id. at Art. 6.2 (requiring Parties, when using ITMOs towards their nationally determined 
contributions, to “promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity”). See also 
id. at Art. 6.4 (indicating that the SDM is intended “to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse 
gas emissions and support sustainable development”).  
7 See, e.g., United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
Human Rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, https://perma.cc/9KDL-DHDQ (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2018); United Nations Division for Social Policy and Development Disability, 
Relationship between Development and Human Rights, https://perma.cc/NGS5-C2EM (last visited Apr. 
29, 2018). 
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2. MARKET MECHANISMS IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, often termed the “cooperative approaches provision,” 
establishes a framework under which Parties may cooperate in the implementation of their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs). 8  The article identifies three possible forms of 
cooperation – two market-based approaches and one non-market approach 9  – but these are 
arguably intended as examples. 10  Several Parties to the Paris Agreement, as well as some 
commentators and observers, have argued that Article 6 is sufficiently broad to encompass any 
form of “voluntary cooperation” used by Parties to advance progress towards their NDCs.11  
This paper focuses on the market-based cooperative approaches in Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of 
the Paris Agreement. While the potential for non-market cooperation is also recognized in Article 
6.8 of the Paris Agreement, that option is less well developed, with the article merely stating that 
“non-market approaches [are] available to Parties” and providing no detail on what form those 
approaches may take. In this way, Article 6.8 differs from Articles 6.2 and 6.4, which identify 
specific forms of market-based cooperation. Similarly, whereas Articles 6.2 and 6.4 are the subject 
of a detailed work program aimed at operationalizing the market-based approaches, the work 
program for Article 6.8 is expressed in general terms. Indeed, the only direction provided is that 
the work program should consider “how to facilitate the implementation and coordination of non-
market approaches.” As a result, significant uncertainty remains as to how Article 6.8 will be 
                                                     
8 Paris Agreement, Art. 6.1 
9 Id. at Art. 6.2, 6.4, & 6.8. 
10  ANDREI MARCU, CARBON MARKET PROVISIONS IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT 4 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/7KFE-P3AT (arguing that “Paragraphs 6.2-6.3 (transfers), paragraphs 6.4-6.7 
(creation of reductions / mitigation outcomes under the CMA), and a non-market framework 
(paragraphs 6.8-6.9) are particular cases of cooperative approaches, but the interpretation can be 
that this does not represent an exhaustive list”). 
11 Id. (indicating that Article 6 “is broad, is meant to be broad, and is understood to cover all 
types of cooperation among Parties in implementation of their NDCs”). See also Submission of 
Norway on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/7PCQ-QNEA (noting 
that “the nature of cooperation may . . . change over time. New approaches can play an important 
role in future market-based cooperation”). 
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operationalized and, in particular, the future design of any non-market approaches pursued 
thereunder. For that reason, non-market approaches are not considered in this paper.  
2.1 Article 6.2: Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes 
Article 6.2 provides for “the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes [or 
ITMOs] towards” NDCs. This is a new concept – the term “ITMO” was first used during informal 
negotiations in the lead-up to adoption of the Paris Agreement – intended to encompass all 
international transfers engaged in by Parties for the purpose of achieving their NDCs. It establishes 
a “bottom-up” approach, whereby “mitigation outcomes” resulting from domestic or international 
programs may be transferred by Parties, at which point they become ITMOs.12 
The Paris Agreement does not on its face impose any restrictions on the source of 
mitigation outcomes.13  Various international programs have been identified by Parties to the 
Agreement, observers, and commentators as possible sources, including the existing framework 
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD/REDD+) which is 
continued under Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, and the new sustainable development 
mechanism (SDM) created in Article 6 of the Agreement.14 Existing and new programs at the 
regional or national level, such as Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism, might also be a source of 
mitigation outcomes.15 
Mitigation outcomes developed through these and other programs can only be transferred 
internationally for use towards NDCs in accordance with Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the Paris 
                                                     
12 See generally, Submission of New Zealand on Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 17, 
2017), https://perma.cc/N65Y-389U (stating that Article 6.2 reflects “a ‘bottom-up’ world of 
cooperation in which mitigation outcomes are transferred from one Party to another and used 
towards the achievement of that other Party’s . . . NDC”).   
13 Marcu, supra note [10], at 5 (noting that the Paris Agreement does not contain “any 
qualifier to restrict the use of these provisions to units / outcomes emanating from mechanisms / 
procedures / protocols that are under the authority of the COP”).  
14  See generally, SBSTA, Report of Round-Table Discussion Among Parties Held on 4 
November 2017 (Nov. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/LLZ5-J6LJ (noting that some Parties view 
emissions reductions generated through the SDM as ITMOs “that are subject to the accounting 
guidance in Article 6.2 when they are internationally transferred”).  
15 Marcu, supra note [10], at 6. 
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Agreement.16 Under those articles, transfers must “be voluntary and authorized by Participating 
Parties,”17 who must “promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and 
transparency, including in governance, and . . . apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties 
[to the UNFCCC (COP),] serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement” (CMA), on the 
recommendation of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).18 Under 
the Paris Agreement work program, SBSTA must develop recommended guidance, which will be 
considered during the first session of the CMA.19  
In submissions to SBSTA, Parties have expressed opposing views on the appropriate scope 
of the guidance and, in particular, whether it should be limited to provisions dealing with 
accounting for ITMOs. Such limits have been supported by some Parties, including Australia and 
Japan, who emphasize that the Paris Agreement only envisages the adoption of accounting 
guidance and leaves other issues relating to the use of ITMOs, such as how to ensure 
environmental integrity, to the discretion of national governments.20 Other Parties have, however, 
                                                     
16 Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the Paris Agreement do not apply to domestic use of mitigation 
outcomes (i.e., by the country in which they were produced). See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.2 
(referring to “international” transfers).  
17 Id. at Art. 6.3. 
18  Id. at Art. 6.2. See also Decisions Adopted by the COP at its 21st Session, 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, P 36 (Jan. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y7Y9-HD7W (requesting that the 
SBSTA “develop and recommend the guidance referred to under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 
Agreement”) [hereinafter COP21 Decisions]. 
19 Id.  
20 See e.g., Submission of Japan on Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in 
Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (Mar. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y3KN-QMWJ 
(stating that “[t]he scope of the guidance is limited to the accounting towards the achievement 
NDCs” and recommending that other matters arising under Article 6.2, such as “[p]romoting 
sustainable development and ensuring environmental integrity . . . should be carried out under the 
responsibility of the Parties engaging in the cooperative approaches”); Submission of Australia on 
the Content of the Guidance for Article 6.2, Including the Structure and Areas, Issues and Elements 
to be Addressed (Oct. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/R2SX-TU35 (arguing that “[g]uidance is not 
mandated nor required” on environmental integrity and sustainable development). 
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expressed concern regarding the adequacy of this approach and recommended the adoption of 
broad guidance on environmental integrity and other issues arising under Articles 6.2 and 6.3.21  
Some of those in favor of broad guidance have also advocated for centralized oversight of 
the use of ITMOs, arguing that this is necessary to ensure compliance with Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of 
the Paris Agreement.22 Some Parties appear to support the establishment of a new international 
body to oversee the ITMO framework, while others have suggested assigning oversight 
responsibility to the body created under Article 6.4 to supervise the SDM (see part [2.2] below). A 
third group have opposed both approaches, arguing that the Paris Agreement does not envisage 
establishment of a central body to oversee the ITMO framework, but rather assumes oversight will 
occur at the national level.23  
                                                     
21 See e.g., Submission of Saint Lucia on behalf of the Caribbean Community on Guidance 
Referred to in Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/UQ65-HSPH 
(arguing that “[i]t will not be sufficient for Article 6 guidance to just address the mechanics of 
accounting”); Submission by the Republic of the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island 
States on Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement (Apr. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/Q94U-TZ6D 
(calling for guidance on how to ensure environmental integrity and promote sustainable 
development in activities under Article 6.2). Note that several countries’ submissions supported 
the adoption of guidance on how to ensure environmental integrity, but not how to promote 
sustainable development, arguing that this is a national prerogative. See e.g., Submission of Brazil 
on the Guidance Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/SGK3-S7MP.  
22  See generally SBST, Report of Round-Table Discussion Among Parties Held on 5 
November 2017 (Nov. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/2RSQ-ALAB (noting that some Parties 
recommended “establishment of a centralized oversight body . . . [to] ensure Parties act 
consistently with CMA guidance in order to comply with “shall requirements” in Articles 6.2 and 
6.3). See also, Submission of Saint Lucia on behalf of the Caribbean Community on Guidance 
Referred to in Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2016), https://perma.cc/UQ65-HSPH 
(calling for international oversight under the CMA); Submission of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on Operationalization of 
Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement (Mar. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/CV45-YYDV 
(arguing that a “centralized oversight mechanism should be established” under the auspices of the 
UNFCCC Secretariat). 
23 See e.g., Submission of New Zealand on the Guidance Referred to in Article 6(2) of the 
Paris Agreement (Sep. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/DF9D-9P8A (arguing that “the COP did not 
request the SBSTA to develop rules or recommendations for a supervising body for the cooperative 
approaches envisaged in Article 6.2” and recommending that such approaches be supervised at the 
national level); Submission of Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group on Art. 
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2.2 Article 6.4: Sustainable Development Mechanism 
Whereas Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement reflects a “bottom-up” approach to cooperation, 
Article 6.4 embodies a “top-down” approach, whereby mitigation outcomes are produced and 
certified through an international mechanism.24 It is similar to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which established the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allowing industrialized countries to 
meet their emission reduction targets using credits generated by projects hosted in developing 
countries.25 Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a new, broader mechanism, known as the 
SDM, under which any country may elect to host credit-generating emission reduction projects.26 
The host country may, subject to international oversight, transfer the credits to others for use in 
meeting their NDCs.27  
Under Article 6.4, SDM projects must both “contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and support sustainable development.”28 With respect to the former, Article 6.4 provides 
that the SDM should “contribute to the reduction of emissions levels in the host” country29 and 
“deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions,”30 suggesting that projects must not simply 
                                                                                                                                                                                
6 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/LSG9-77HC (arguing that the use of 
ITMOs should be supervised by national authorities).  
24 See generally, Marcu, supra note [x], at 13 (arguing that “[t]he SDM set-up is in clear 
contrast to cooperative approaches (P.A. Articles 6.2-6.3), which can be seen as a procedure / 
protocol for transferring mitigation outcomes internationally and where Parties are the principal 
actors and follow accounting protocols that are consistent with CMA guidance”). See also 
Submission of New Zealand on Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/N65Y-389U (describing the SDM as a “’top-down’ mechanism established under 
the guidance and authority of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Paris Agreement (CMA) with a supervising body designated by the CMA”).  
25 See generally, Susan Biniaz, Analyzing Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement Along a 
“Nationally” and “Internationally” Determined Continuum, in MARKET MECHANISMS AND THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 55, 57 (Harvard Project on Climate Agreement, 2017).  
26 Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4(c). See also Marcu, supra note [10], at 15 (noting that “there is no 
reference made in paragraphs 6.4-6.76 [sic] of the PA to any differentiation, or limitation that 
would not allow the SDM to operate in certain Parties”).  
27 See Paris Agreement, Art. 6.4(c). 
28 Id. at Art. 6.4(a).  
29 Id. at Art. 6.4(c).  
30 Id. at Art. 6.4(d).  
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involve offsetting or shifting emissions between countries.31 Consistent with this view, the Paris 
Agreement work programme requires adoption of rules 32  to ensure projects deliver “real, 
measurable, and long-term reductions,” which are “additional to any that would otherwise 
occur.”33 The rules must also include procedures for the verification and certification of emissions 
reductions, which will be performed by a newly established international body.34  
Unlike the ITMO regime, for which no governance system is defined in the Paris 
Agreement, the SDM is declared to be under the CMA’s authority and subject to supervision by a 
CMA-designated body.35 While the composition and structure of the supervising body has not yet 
been agreed, it is widely expected to be modelled on the CDM Executive Board (EB).36 Some 
changes will, however, likely be made to address perceived shortcomings in the design of the 
CDM EB. For example, whereas membership of the CDM EB is weighted towards industrialized 
countries, there is broad agreement that the SDM supervising board should include an equal 
number of members from developing countries.37 A number of Parties have also criticized the 
                                                     
31 CARBON MARKET WATCH, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A ROBUST SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
MECHANISM 3-4 (2017), https://perma.cc/86QT-4XUE (arguing that “the SDM must not be an 
offsetting tool,” but “must lead to emissions reductions that would not have otherwise occurred, 
must not correspond to increased emissions elsewhere, and contribute to a ratchet of ambition over 
time”).  
32 Draft rules are currently being developed by SBSTA and will be submitted to SMA for 
adoption during its first session. 
33 COP21 Decisions, supra note 18, at 37. 
34 Id.  
35 Paris Agreement, Article 6.4. 
36 See e.g., Marcu, supra note [x], at 4 (indicating that “the CDM Executive Board (EB) will 
be very much the model used”). 
37 See e.g., Submission of the Republic of Rwanda on behalf of the Member States of the 
Central African Forestry Commission (COMIFAC) on Article 6 (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/8X5E-TBJT (arguing that the composition of the supervising body should “ensure 
parity between developing and advanced countries”); Submission of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on Matters Relating to 
Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement (July 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/C87C-HYM5 
(indicating that the supervisory board should “consist of equal representation of developed and 
developing country Parties and . . . include one representative from an LDC [Least Developed 
Country] Party and one from an AOSIS [Alliance of Small Island States] Party”); Submission of 
New Zealand on Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/N65Y-389U 
(arguing that “the composition of [the supervising] body should be broadly and equitably 
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political nature of the CDM EB and argued that the SDM supervising board should be comprised 
of technical experts rather than bureaucrats (as is currently true of the CDM EB).38 
The SDM supervising body will oversee emissions reduction projects and, after verifying 
that they have delivered “real, measurable, and long-term” savings, issue credits that can be used 
by Parties towards their NDCs.39 Oversight may also occur at the national level, with several 
Parties arguing that countries should be required to designate national authorities to oversee their 
involvement in the SDM. 40  According to some Parties, these national authorities should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                
geographically representative to align with inclusive participation in the mechanism.” The body 
should “should comprise of two representatives from each UN regional group, 1 representative 
from Small Island Developing States and 1 representative from Least Developed Countries”). 
38  See e.g., Submission by South Africa on rules, modalities and procedures for the 
mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement 2 (Apr. 25, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/3NZY-JLDH (stating that “the [SDM] governance body needs sound technical 
expertise to ensure the efficient functioning of the mechanism”); Submission of the Republic of 
Indonesia on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/DB9R-ZPCX 
(arguing that the SDM body should be “more technical and less political”). Submission by 
Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/EB52-4YFR (arguing that the supervising body should comprise 
“technical experts, so that it is less politicized as [sic] similar existing bodies”). For a discussion of 
the politicization of the CDM EB, see FLORENS FLUES ET AL., UN APPROVAL OF GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS REDUCTION PROJECTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CDM 
EXECUTIVE BOARD 2 (2008), http://perma.cc/4ZMK-ZQE3. 
39 See generally, Susan Biniaz, Analyzing Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement along a 
“Nationally” and “Internationally” Determined Continuum, in Market Mechanisms and the Paris 
Agreement 55, 56 (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 2017).  
40 See e.g., Submission of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on 
Matters Relating Under Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement (Nov. 7. 2017), 
https://perma.cc/Z8UL-37SG (arguing that “[e]ach Party that wishes to host [SDM] activities shall 
establish a national designated authority to oversee the governance of [the] activities” and “[e]ach 
Party that that wishes to undertake a mitigation activity within another Party as a means of 
fulfilling their NDC must establish a national designated authority to oversee the activities”); 
Submission of Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, and Switzerland on Matters Relating to Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/M8BY-Q5AN (indicating that Parties 
participating in the SDM should “designate[], by communicating it to the Secretariat, a national 
authority that authorizes participation of activities on its territory . . . and records international 
transfers of emissions credits”); Submission of South Africa on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement: Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, 
Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/6AB9-B7D7 (arguing that 
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responsible for ensuring that activities under the SDM promote sustainable development (i.e., as 
required under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement),41 though others have suggested that this falls 
within the responsibility of the central supervising body.42  
2.3 Related Provisions of the Paris Agreement 
While market-based cooperation is primarily dealt with in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, 
which outlines the key rules governing ITMOs and the SDM, use of those instruments is also 
affected by several other provisions. The most important provisions are discussed in this part. 
Article 4.13: Accounting. Under Article 4.13 of the Paris Agreement, Parties must account for 
all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and sinks corresponding to their NDCs, in accordance 
with guidance adopted by the CMA. The guidance may include provisions on accounting for 
transfers under Article 6 to ensure that emissions reductions sold thereunder are not counted 
towards achievement of the seller’s NDC and indicating when / how they may be counted by the 
purchaser.43 These issues could, in addition or as an alternative, also be dealt with in the guidance 
adopted under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement.44 
Article 13: Transparency. Article 13.1 of the Paris Agreement establishes a so-called 
“enhanced transparency framework” intended to, among other things, provide a “clear 
understanding” of Parties progress towards achieving their NDCs.45 To that end, under Article 
                                                                                                                                                                                
activities “must be monitored and judged at the national level through an appropriate designated 
national authority”).  
41  See e.g., Submission of South Africa on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement: Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, 
Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/6AB9-B7D7 (arguing that the 
promotion of sustainable development must be monitored and judged at the national level 
through an appropriate designated national authority”).  
42  See generally, SBSTA, Informal Note on Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the 
Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/K5L2-Q49R. 
43 See generally, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, Informal Note on APA 
Agenda Item 3: Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/CP.21 (Nov. 
13, 2017), https://perma.cc/62E9-DNAJ (listing rules relating to “transfers of ITMOs” as a possible 
element of the accounting guidance). 
44 Id. (suggesting that the accounting guidance “cross-reference” to the guidance developed 
under Article 6). 
45 Paris Agreement, Art. 13.5. 
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13.7, Parties must produce regular greenhouse gas inventory reports showing emissions and 
removals by source.46 Draft guidance on the reports, developed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Paris Agreement, indicates that they should “account for any transfer[s]” under Article 6.47 The 
guidance further recommends that Parties provide information on how (if at all) transfers were 
used to achieve their NDCs.48 This and other information will be subject to technical expert review, 
under which a panel drawn from the UNFCCC’s Roster of Experts49 will assess the relevant Party’s 
progress towards achieving its NDC, and identify any areas for improvement.50 The panel could 
review any transfers undertaken by the party, for example, to determine whether they comply 
with the requirements of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.51 
Article 15: Implementation and Compliance. Article 15.1 establishes a “mechanism to facilitate 
implementation of and promote compliance with” the Paris Agreement. The mechanism is to 
consist of a twelve-member committee which will be responsible for assisting Parties to implement 
the provisions of the Paris Agreement and comply with their obligations thereunder.52 Consistent 
with this mandate, the committee could monitor transfers to ensure they comply with Article 6, 
and work with Parties to remedy any non-compliance. Draft operating rules for the committee 
indicate that it may issue warning statements and/or other communications to Parties that fail to 
comply with the Paris Agreement and/or work with them to develop remedial action plans.53 
                                                     
46 Id. at Art. 13.7(a).  
47 APA, Informal Note on Draft Elements for APA Agenda Item 5: Modalities, Procedures 
and Guidelines for the Transparency Framework for Action and Support Referred to in Article 13 
of the Paris Agreement 14 (Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/2H3J-EQPH [hereinafter Informal Note 
on Article 13].  
48 Id. at 18, 21 
49  The UNFCCC Roster of Experts is comprised of individuals nominated by their 
respective governments to contribute to various processes mandated by the COP, CMA, and 
subsidiary bodies. See UNFCCC, Roster of Experts, https://perma.cc/2E5E-JFSQ (accessed Feb. 27, 
2018). 
50 Paris Agreement, Art. 13.11 – 13.12. See also Informal Note on Article 13, supra note 47, at 
42. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 15.2; COP21 Decisions, supra note 18, at 102. 
53 APA, Draft Elements for APA Agenda Item 7: Modalities and Procedures for the Effective 
Operation of the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance Referred to in 
Article 15.2 of the Paris Agreement 12-13 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/H3GA-KGW2.  
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3. RELATIONSHIP OF ARTICLE 6 TO EXISTING EMISSION 
REDUCTION MECHANISMS AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
The cooperative approaches in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement build on, and in some 
respects duplicate, pre-existing mechanisms established in the Kyoto Protocol and other 
international agreements. Some of these mechanisms (e.g., the CDM) are expected to be phased 
out, while others (e.g., REDD/REDD+) may continue to operate, though both approaches remain 
contentious. There is significant uncertainty as to how any phase-outs will occur and the likely 
interaction of any continued mechanisms with the ITMO framework and SDM. These issues are 
explored below. 
3.1 Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms 
Unlike the Paris Agreement, which expects all countries to take action on climate change, 
the Kyoto Protocol only required action by developed countries, which are subject to binding 
emissions reduction targets (Annex B countries). These targets, which are expressed as allowed 
emissions or “assigned amounts” over the periods 2008-2012 and 2013-2020, may be met either 
through domestic action or using international trading mechanisms. Three such mechanisms are 
identified in the Kyoto Protocol, namely: 
1. International Emissions Trading (IET), whereby Annex B countries may transfer emissions 
units (known as “assigned amount units” or “AAUs”) from their targets, such that the 
seller emits less than its assigned amount and the purchaser can emit more; 
2. Joint Implementation (JI), whereby one Annex B country may fund emission reduction 
projects in another, and use the resulting credits (known as “emission reduction units” or 
“ERUs”) to meet its assigned amount; and  
3. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), whereby an Annex B country may use credits 
(known as “certified emissions reductions” or “CERs”) generated through projects it funds 
in other, non-Annex B countries. 
The JI/CDM framework is widely considered to have been the model for the SDM in Article 
6.4 of the Paris Agreement. While some Parties to the Paris Agreement have suggested that the 
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JI/CDM framework could continue operating alongside the SDM, 54  most have advocated its 
phasing out, indicating that it should no longer be used to fund emissions reduction projects from 
2020.55 Less consideration has, however, been given to the treatment of JI/CDM projects funded 
prior to 2020 that continue to deliver emissions reductions thereafter.  
The COP decision accompanying the Paris Agreement “[e]ncourages Parties to promote the 
voluntary cancellation” of credits from existing JI/CDM projects,56 but goes on to suggest that any 
uncanceled credits may be used by Parties towards their NDCs.57 Some Parties appear to assume 
that no restrictions will be imposed on the use of JI/CDM project credits,58 whereas others have 
suggested that use should only be permitted where the project meets the requirements of the 
SDM.59 This would necessitate reassessment of projects – though how this would occur and by 
whom remains uncertain – and may limit the number of JI/CDM credits that can be reused.60 
                                                     
54  See e.g., Submission of Norway on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/5B74-ZDRJ (noting that “[t]he Kyoto Protocol is not limited in time, and in principle the 
CDM could continue”).  
55 See e.g., Submission of Estonia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European 
Union and its Members on Article 6 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4XC3-KPMY (arguing that “the 
mechanisms defined under the Kyoto Protocol shall not continue after the second commitment 
period” ending in 2020).  
56 COP21 Decisions, supra note [18], at 106. 
57 Id. at 107 (urging Parties to report transparently on ITMOs generated through the Kyoto 
Protocol flexibility mechanisms).  
58 See e.g., Submission of the Republic of Tunisia on 1) the Guidance Referred to in Article 
6(2) of the Paris Agreement, 2) Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by 
Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement and 3) on the work programme under the 
framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement 
(Sep. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/ECE2-HNQL (calling, generally, for the continued issuance of CER 
for “CDM activities with crediting periods beyond year-end of 2019).  
59 See e.g., Submission of Republic of Korea on Art. 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement (Nov. 
2, 2011), https://perma.cc/X733-S2XH (arguing that CDM projects should “continue to be valid 
after reassessment in accordance with relevant rules, modalities, and procedures under Art. 6.4”).  
60 Some stakeholders have argued that existing JI/CDM projects cannot be considered to 
deliver “additional” emissions reductions as required under the SDM. See ASH SHARMA, CARBON 
MARKETS FIRMLY BACK ON THE AGENDA (2016), https://perma.cc/7EV7-V8YN.  
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3.2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
The Paris Agreement expressly provides for the continuation of REDD/REDD+, with 
Article 5 encouraging Parties “to take action to implement and support . . . the existing 
framework” therefor. Briefly, under the REDD/REDD+ framework, developing countries can 
obtain results-based payments for emissions reductions associated with avoiding deforestation 
and forest degradation, conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks, and ensuring sustainable 
forest management.61 Payments may be channeled through international organizations, such as the 
World Bank, or provided by individual countries and have often taken the form of “donations” for 
which the funder receives nothing in return.62 Recently, however, there has been a push to use 
REDD/REDD+ projects to generate credits which can be sold to third parties for use in meeting 
their domestic or international emissions reduction commitments. One example of this approach is 
the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, whereby governments and others can 
contribute to a carbon fund, which is used to purchase emissions reduction credits generated 
through REDD/REDD+ projects.63 The credits are then distributed to participants in the fund in 
proportion to their contribution.64 
There has historically been no process within the UNFCCC framework for crediting 
emissions reductions generated through REDD/REDD+ projects.65 Thus, for example, developed 
countries could not meet their emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol by funding 
                                                     
61 Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteen Session, Decision 
2/CP.13 (Mar. 14, 2008), https://perma.cc/QPP4-U7Z7; Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the 
Party on its Fifteenth Session, Decision 4/CP.15 (Mar. 30, 2010), https://perma.cc/G394-2TKX; 
Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Decision 1/CP.16 
(Mar. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/4G5Z-5NDZ.  
62 One example of a donation type REDD/REDD+ scheme is Brazil’s Amazon Fund. See 
Government of Brazil, Amazon Fund, http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/home/ (accessed Mar. 1, 
2018).   
63 See generally WORLD BANK FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, THE CARBON FUND OF 
THE FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY (2013), https://perma.cc/CMM3-U8W3; WORLD BANK 
FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, THE FCPF: PILOTING REDD+ PROGRAMS AT SCALE (2013), 
https://perma.cc/2QD7-FRN3.  
64 Id. 
65 UN-REDD PROGRAMME, TOWARDS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF REDD+ UNDER THE 
UNFCCC 102 (2016), https://perma.cc/LQ6W-FPLA.  
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REDD/REDD+ projects.66 However, that may be possible under the Paris Agreement, with various 
stakeholders arguing that the ITMO framework established in Article 6.2 can be used to credit 
REDD/REDD+ projects. 67  Assuming the Parties agree to this, various questions relating to 
interaction of the ITMO and REDD/REDD+ frameworks will need to be considered, including 
whether projects must meet the requirements of both regimes and how and by whom compliance 
with those requirements will be assessed.68 
3.3 Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
A third market-based mechanism with implications for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement is 
the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). Established by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2016, CORSIA requires international 
airlines to offset any growth in their carbon dioxide emissions above 2020 levels by purchasing 
credits, reflecting emissions reductions in other sectors.69 Such credits may originate from the 
cooperative approaches in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and/or other market-based 
mechanisms under the UNFCCC.  
The resolution establishing CORSIA indicates that “units generated from mechanisms 
established under the UNFCCC . . . are eligible for use” by airlines to offset emissions increases, 
“provided that they align with [applicable ICAO] decisions.”70 The mechanisms must, for example, 
be consistent with ICAO-developed criteria on the emissions units eligible for use under CORSIA 
                                                     
66  International Institute for Environment and Development, REDD: Protecting Climate, 
Forests, and Livelihoods, https://perma.cc/3L5T-HRLL (accessed Mar. 3, 2018).  
67 See e.g., PETER GRAHAM, COOPERATIVE APPROACHES FOR SUPPORTING REDD+: LINKING 
ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT (2017), https://perma.cc/HBJ8-F73Q.  
68 Some parties appear to assume that, in order to be credited, REDD/REDD+ projects must 
meet the requirements of any guidance issued under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. See e.g., 
Submission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on behalf of the Coalition of Rainforest 
Nations on Article 6, Paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement (Mar. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/Q3PU-
94JX. Others, however, have argued that the REDD+ framework already establishes project 
requirements and that further rules are unnecessary. See e.g., Submission of the Republic of 
Rwanda on behalf of Member States of the Central African Forestry Commission (COMIFAC) on 
Article 6 (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/UY6U-NEUK.  
69  ICAO Resolution A39-3: Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and 
Practices Related to Environmental Protection – Global Market-Based Measure (MBM) Scheme 
(2016), https://perma.cc/698X-CM28.  
70 Id. at 21. 
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(emissions unit criteria or EUCs).71 At the time of writing, draft EUCs had been developed by 
ICAO, but were yet to be finalized.72 Given this, and as the draft EUCs have not been made public, 
it is not yet known whether emissions units generated through UNFCCC mechanisms will be 
available for use under CORSIA.73  
Incorporating Human Rights Safeguards in the New Article 6 Mechanisms 
There has been some debate as to whether the rules and guidelines promulgated under 
Articles 6.2 and 6.4 should incorporate social and environmental safeguards aimed at protecting 
human rights in the context of mitigation projects. Social and environmental safeguards are 
frequently employed by international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to 
prevent and mitigate harm associated with financed projects. Such safeguards are also embedded 
within the governing rules for UNFCCC financial mechanisms, including the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), Global Climate Fund (GCF), and Adaptation Fund (AF), as well market-based 
mechanisms such as the CDM and REDD+.  
Most safeguard policies focus on the protection of procedural rights: for example, by 
requiring the disclosure of information to and consultations with the communities that may be 
adversely affected by a particular project. In some cases, the policies go beyond consultation and 
require the prior informed consent of the affected community (for example, where an indigenous 
community will be seriously affected by the project). Some safeguard policies also incorporate 
more substantive elements, such as requirements to minimize adverse social and environmental 
impacts and to provide compensation to people who are adversely affected by a project.74   
                                                     
71 Id. at 20(c). 
72  See ICAO, PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST EDITION OF ANNEX 16, VOLUME IV, CONCERNING 
STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES RELATING TO THE CARBON OFFSETTING AND REDUCTION 
SCHEME FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION (CORSIA) (2017), https://perma.cc/7KBF-RDBK.  
73 Regardless of the content of the EUCs, using SDM-generated units may be difficult, at 
least in the short-term. As one commentators has observed, until more detailed rules are 
developed for the SDM, ICAO may be unable to determine whether units generated by the 
mechanism meet the EUCs. See SUSAN BINIAZ, ICAO’S CORSIA AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT: CROSS-
CUTTING ISSUES (2017), https://perma.cc/X9ND-RJZ4. 
74 For more information about the nature of existing safeguard policies and how they might 
be updated in the context of Article 6, see infra Section 4.3 (“Learning from Existing Safeguards”). 
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There is a compelling rationale for incorporating procedural and substantive human rights 
safeguards into the SDM and ITMO mechanisms. However, because Article 6 is silent on this topic, 
there are many questions about whether and how safeguards could be embedded within the 
mechanisms’ governing rules. Based on their submissions to the SBSTA, most Parties appear to 
agree that human rights safeguards can and should be embedded within the rules governing the 
SDM,75 but there is less agreement on whether and how safeguards should be incorporated into the 
ITMO guidance (and whether the Paris Agreement even envisions safeguards in that context).76 
Going forward, the Parties will also need to determine exactly what the Article 6 safeguard policies 
should entail and to what extent they should differ from existing policies, such as that established 
for the CDM. Some considerations relevant to the design and implementation of Article 6 
safeguards are discussed below. 
3.4 Policy Rationale and Legal Justification 
The primary function of environmental and social safeguard policies is to avoid and/or 
mitigate the harmful impacts of programs and projects on people and the environment. This is 
important because even projects that are aimed at delivering social and/or environmental benefits 
can result in serious harms, including violations of fundamental human rights. Hydroelectric dams 
provide one example of a climate change mitigation project that can deliver important benefits 
(clean energy and flood protection) while also causing major harms (the displacement of people 
and the destruction of ecosystems).77 Bioenergy projects are similarly problematic. While such 
projects can reduce emissions and dependency on fossil fuels, some observers have also tied them 
to human rights violations such as the displacement of local people, adverse local health and 
environmental effects, failure to inform people about potential harms, violence and sexual 
                                                     
75 See e.g., Submission of Estonia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European 
Union and its Members on Article 6 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4XC3-KPMY.  
76 Parties supporting the integration of human rights safeguards in the context of Article 6.2 
include Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, and Monaco. See Submission by Switzerland on behalf 
of the Environmental Integrity Group on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/EB52-4YFR. 
77  Economic, Social & Cultural Rights and Climate Change: A Legal Reference Guide 68-69 
(Sébastien Jodoin & Katherine Lofts eds., CISDL, GEM & ASAP 2013); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘First, 
Do No Harm’: Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate Change (2010) 38 Ga. J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 
593, 597-98. 
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exploitation perpetrated by contractors and employees, bad faith negotiations, and failure to 
comply with promises to the community.78 Examples of projects that have resulted in serious 
human rights violations include the CDM-funded Bajo Aguá biogas recovery project in Honduras79 
and the OPIC-funded Buchanan Renewables biofuels project in Liberia.80  
A secondary function of safeguards is to minimize the risk of public opposition and other 
controversies that have, in the past, derailed individual projects and called entire programs into 
question. While this function may not be the stated purpose of safeguard policies, it does 
incentivize their uptake. It also helps to ensure that money invested in, for example, climate 
mitigation efforts is not wasted on lengthy disputes and dysfunctional projects.  
The aforementioned considerations are all relevant to the question of whether safeguards 
should be incorporated into the Article 6 mechanisms. But there is also the question of legal 
justification, and in particular, whether the Paris Agreement explicitly authorizes or requires the 
incorporation of safeguards. Granted, even in the absence of an express authorization, the Parties 
to the UNFCCC could enter into a subsequent agreement to adopt safeguards. But this would 
prove more politically challenging than implementing safeguards which can be tied to specific 
requirements and/or authorities within the Paris Agreement. 
Article 6 is silent on the issue of human rights and safeguards. But there is one important 
textual reference to human rights in the preamble to the Paris Agreement, where the Parties 
acknowledge that they “should . . . respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations on 
human rights” when taking action to address climate change. 81  This creates an overarching 
expectation that the Parties will, in implementing the Paris Agreement, take steps to safeguard 
human rights.  
                                                     
78  Accountability Counsel, Fueling Human Rights Disasters: An examination of the U.S. 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation’s Investment in Buchanan Renewables (2014); ActionAid, 
Feeling the biofuels pressure: Human rights abuses in Guatemala (2013); Center for Human Rights and 
Global Justice, Foreign Land Deals and Human Rights: Case Studies on Agricultural and Biofuel 
Investment (NYU School of Law 2010). 
79  Jeanette Schade & Wolfgang Obergassel, Human Rights and the Clean Development 
Mechanism, 27(4) Cambridge Review of International Affairs 717 (2014).  
80 Accountability Counsel (2014), supra note 80. 
81 Paris Preamble. 
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The need for human rights safeguards in the context of Article 6 is further reinforced by 
language tying its implementation to the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Specifically, 
Article 6.2 directs Parties to “promote sustainable development” when engaging in cooperative 
approaches that use ITMOs, and Article 6.4 states that one goal of the SDM is to “support 
sustainable development.” The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
repeatedly affirmed that respect for, and fulfillment of, human rights is essential to sustainable 
development. 82  Consistent with this view, in adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, the UN General Assembly recognized that the SDGs “seek to realize the human 
rights of all” and emphasized “the responsibilities of all states . . . to respect, protect, and promote 
human rights.”83 It would therefore be appropriate to interpret Article 6 of the Paris Agreement – 
particularly when read in conjunction with the preamble – as authorizing the imposition of 
safeguards aimed at ensuring human rights are respected in the implementation of cooperative 
approaches.  
There is also a structural justification for adopting human rights safeguards in the context 
of the SDM. As discussed in Part II, the SDM will likely serve a function similar to that of the 
CDM, providing a mechanism whereby Parties can sponsor climate change mitigation projects and 
then take credit for the emission reductions. Recognizing this, the Paris Agreement provides for 
centralized oversight and enforcement of rules pertaining to the SDM. The CDM was governed in 
a similar manner, with an executive board charged with its oversight, and the CDM modalities and 
procedures included a set of rules aimed at ensuring adequate stakeholder consultation.84 While 
those rules have been criticized as too weak, and have failed to alleviate all concerns about human 
rights violations in the context of CDM projects, their adoption was an important first step towards 
                                                     
82 See, e.g., UN OHCHR, supra note 7; UN OHCHR, Sustainable Development Goals and Related 
Human Rights, https://perma.cc/UGW9-MEEA.  
83  UN General Assembly Resolution, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
84  UNFCCC Decision 3/CMP.1, Modalities and procedures for a clean development 
mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, UN Doc. FCCC/ KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 
(March 30, 2006); UNFCCC, CDM Standards, https://perma.cc/4XZG-JSW2. 
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protecting human rights.85 It would be illogical and retrogressive to exclude such protections from 
the SDM procedures and modalities.  
 In light of these factors, some Parties have advocated for the inclusion of human 
rights safeguards in the SDM in their submissions to the SBSTA, often linking this to the 
requirement that the SDM “promote sustainable development” and to the broader understanding 
that all Parties respect human rights in implementation of the Paris Agreement.86 The European 
Union submission, for example, has stated that the rules, modalities and procedures for the SDM 
should require host Parties to “report on the promotion of sustainable development and 
conformity with their respective obligations on human rights” and “ensure the transparency of 
decision-making processes at all levels, local stakeholder consultations, the rights of directly 
affected entities to hearings prior to decision-making, that issues linked to human rights are 
promptly referred to relevant UN bodies, and timely decisions.”87 The submission specifically links 
this proposal to the human rights language in the preamble to the Paris Agreement, as well as the 
fact that all Parties have adopted the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals.88 
The structural case for safeguards is less clear for Article 6.2 ITMOs. The mechanism 
envisioned under Article 6.2 will likely be a system for verifying and crediting emission 
reductions, and as noted above, there are no express provisions for centralized oversight of this 
mechanism and several Parties believe the ITMO guidance should be limited to accounting.89 There 
is also less precedent for the adoption of safeguards in this context: while safeguards are standard 
                                                     
85  See infra Section 4.3 for a more detailed discussion of concerns pertaining to CDM 
projects, human rights abuses, and the inadequacy of existing CDM safeguards. 
86 See e.g., Submission of Estonia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European 
Union and its Members on Article 6 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4XC3-KPMY; Submission of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on 
Matters Relating to Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement (July 11, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/C87C-HYM5; Submission by Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity 
Group on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/EB52-4YFR; Submission 
of Tuvalu on Accounting Under Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/PT5W-L2U2. 
87 Submission of Estonia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union 
and its Members on Article 6 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4XC3-KPMY at p. 2, 9. 
88 Id. at 9. 
89 See supra section 2.1. 
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practice for project finance mechanisms, they are not commonly incorporated into cap and trade 
systems. That said, the lack of precedent is not a compelling reason to disregard the potential value 
of safeguards in this context. Programs and activities that generate ITMO credits have the potential 
to adversely affect human rights in the same manner as SDM projects and thus there is an equally 
compelling rationale for safeguards in this context. Recognizing this, several Parties have called for 
the incorporation of human rights safeguards for ITMOs in their submissions to the SBSTA. 
Tuvalu, for example, has stated that all ITMOs “must include a certificate indicating that the units 
traded or received have not resulted in environmental harm or have not adversely affected any 
human rights.”90 Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, and Monaco have argued that human rights 
must be protected in the context of all cooperative approaches implemented under Article 6, and 
that any party engaging in an “Article 6.2 activity” (i.e., an activity generating a tradeable ITMO 
credit)—including the host party, the transferring party, and the acquiring party—must “ensure 
that the activity is consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals, including that it is 
consistent with and represent[s] no threat to human rights.”91 However, most countries have been 
silent on the issue of whether human rights should be addressed in the context of Article 6.2 
ITMOs, even where they have advocated for human rights protections in the context of the Article 
6.4 SDM.92 
3.5 Approaches for Adopting Safeguard Policies 
There are three different approaches for incorporating human rights safeguards into the 
Article 6 market mechanisms that have been discussed: (1) the CMA could promulgate safeguards 
solely for the SDM, (2) the CMA could develop separate safeguards for both the SDM and ITMOs, 
or (3) the CMA could develop an overarching safeguard policy that applies to both mechanisms.   
Safeguards only applicable to the SDM - The most conservative approach would be to 
promulgate safeguards that are only applicable to SDM projects. The process for this would be 
                                                     
90  Submission of Tuvalu on Accounting Under Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Paris 
Agreement (Oct. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/PT5W-L2U2. 
91 Submission by Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group on Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/EB52-4YFR.  
92 See, e.g., Submission of Estonia and the European Commission on Behalf of the European 
Union and its Members on Article 6 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/4XC3-KPMY (lengthy 
discussion of human rights protections for the SDM, no discussion of such protections for ITMOs). 
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relatively straightforward: a safeguard policy could be embedded within the rules, modalities, and 
procedures promulgated by the CMA pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 6. There is little question 
that the CMA has the authority to include such a policy in the rules, given the textual and 
structural justifications described above. The body tasked with overseeing implementation of the 
SDM could be tasked with fleshing out a general safeguard policy adopted by the CMA and could 
play a role in verifying compliance with safeguards. 
Separate safeguards for both the SDM and ITMOs – A separate set of safeguards could also 
be promulgated for ITMOs, potentially embedded within the guidance to be adopted by the CMA 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 6. While there is no explicit authorization in the Paris 
Agreement and slightly less support from the Parties for the adoption of safeguards in this context, 
the CMA could interpret the Paris Agreement as providing authority to adopt such safeguards if it 
felt they were necessary for the promotion of sustainable development and the protection of 
rights.93  
The “safeguards” promulgated for the ITMOs could also take the form of non-binding 
guidance. This may be the most politically feasible approach if many Parties object to the idea that 
the Paris Agreement authorizes a binding safeguard policy for ITMOs, but it would also be the 
least protective of human rights. 
Overarching safeguards applicable to both ITMOs and the SDM -  A third approach would 
be for the CMA to establish an overarching set of human rights safeguards that apply to both 
market mechanisms. This “integrated governance” approach would help to ensure consistent 
treatment of human rights across both mechanisms. The rationale for such an integrated approach 
can be found in the language and structure of Article 6 – specifically, the fact that both the ITMO 
and SDM frameworks a fall under the umbrella of “voluntary cooperation” and are subject to very 
similar standards (e.g., promoting sustainable development) – as well as the Preamble language 
directing Parties to respect and promote human rights in the implementation of all aspects of the 
                                                     
93 While the need to protect human rights is only recognized in the preamble to the Paris 
Agreement, the preambular text may be taken into account in interpreting Article 6. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties indicates that a textual approach should be taken to 
interpreting international agreements and describes an agreement’s preamble as forming part of its 
text. Many international tribunals have, in interpreting treaty provisions, considered preambular 
text. See generally Max H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1281 (2016).  
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agreement.94 These overarching human rights safeguards could also be incorporated into an even 
higher-level guidance document – such as the Paris Implementation Guidelines that are currently 
under development. However, those guidelines will likely be extremely broad and may not 
provide the same specificity of requirements that a more targeted set of safeguards would provide. 
The same could be said of an integrated safeguard policy promulgated exclusively for the Article 6 
market mechanisms – it may be difficult to promulgate adequate safeguards that apply to both 
mechanisms, and thus a more tailored approach may be preferable.  
3.6 Substance of the Safeguards: Learning from Existing Frameworks 
Assuming the CMA does go forward with the adoption of human rights safeguards for one 
or both of the Article 6 market mechanisms, the next question is what exactly those safeguards 
might entail. The CMA could draw on existing experience with the safeguard policies utilized by 
international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, and UNFCCC financial and 
market-based mechanisms to determine the proper scope and substance of safeguards for the SDM 
and ITMOs.  For the ITMO mechanism, it may be helpful to look at how comparable emission 
credit trading schemes currently account for environmental and social justice considerations, as 
those elements are the closest analogs to safeguard policies in this context.  
As noted above, the SDM is similar to the CDM and the governing body for the SDM will 
likely be modelled on the CDM EB. It would therefore make sense to adopt safeguards that, at a 
minimum, are as protective as those which have been adopted for the CDM. The key requirement 
in the CDM safeguards is for local stakeholder consultations,95 with project participants (PPs) and 
coordinating/managing entities (CMEs)96 required to: 
                                                     
94 When interpreting a treaty, Parties are to consider: (i) the express terms of the treaty, (ii) 
the context of those terms, and (iii) the object and purpose of the treaty. Where the express terms 
are ambiguous or would lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, parties may 
also refer to supplementary means of interpretation – for example, by looking at the structural 
framework of the provisions being interpreted. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Arts. 31-32.  
95 The CDM rules include a project standard (PS), a validation and verification standard 
(VVS), and a project cycle procedure (PCP). The consultation requirements are set forth at Version 
9.0 of the PS (para. 74–80), VVS (para. 161–166) and PCP (para. 26, 33). 
96 For a description of the roles of the PPs, CMEs, DOE, and DNA, see UNFCCC, CDM 
Glossary, Version 09.1, CDM-EB07-A04-GLOS, https://perma.cc/V58E-G937. 
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 invite local stakeholders to provide comments on the proposed CDM project or program in an 
open and transparent manner, and in a way that facilitates local participation and allows for a 
reasonable time for comments to be submitted; 
 describe the proposed CDM project or program in a manner that allows the local stakeholders 
to understand the project or program; and 
 demonstrate how measures were taken to appropriately engage stakeholders and solicit 
comments.97 
These consultations must be carried out before the start date of the project or program. The 
CDM rules charge the designated operational entity (DOE)98 for the CDM project or program with 
ensuring that PPs and CMEs comply with these requirements. The CDM rules also establish a 
complaint mechanism whereby local stakeholders can submit complaints to the designated 
national authorities (DNAs) of the host country Party if they believe that there was a violation of 
these requirements.99  
While it could serve as a baseline for the SDM, the CDM safeguard policy has frequently 
been critiqued as relatively weak compared to the safeguard policies adopted by, e.g., international 
financial institutions, and insufficiently protective of human rights. Perhaps the most significant 
gap in the policy is that there are no substantive requirements as to exactly how PPs and CMEs 
must respond to comments during the local stakeholder consultation, and in particular, there are 
no provisions for how to address comments on matters concerning human rights and negative 
environmental impacts due to the implementation of the proposed project or program. Other gaps 
include: (i) there is no requirement to monitor the status of completion of commitments made to 
address concerns raised during the local stakeholder consultation process, and (ii) there is no 
procedure to address stakeholder concerns after the project has been registered.100 Perhaps in part 
due to these problems, there have been documented instances of human rights violations in the 
                                                     
97 CDM Project Standard Version 9.0, ¶¶74–80, CDM Validation and Verification Standard, 
¶¶para. 161–166, and CDM Project Cycle Procedure, ¶¶ 26, 33. 
98 The DOE is the entity designated by the CMP as qualified to validate proposed SDM 
project activities and verify and certify reported GHG emission reductions. See CDM Glossary, 
supra note 95, at 10.  
99 CDM Project Standard Version 9.0, ¶ 79; CDM Validation and Verification Standard, ¶ 
164; CDM Project Cycle Procedure, ¶ 33. 
100 UNFCCC CDM, Concept Note: Improving Stakeholder Consultation Processes, Version 01.0, 
CDM-EB86-AA-A15 (2015) at 11-12. 
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context of CDM projects, 101  and advocates have called for reform of CDM procedures to 
incorporate stronger human rights protections.102 Responding to concerns, the CDM EB did issue a 
report in 2015 which requests the UNFCCC Secretariat to ensure that “in the case that any 
stakeholder comments are received by the Board, which the stakeholders perceive to pertain to 
human rights issues, that these comments be forwarded to the relevant bodies within the United 
Nations system and within the host government.”103 But apart from that, no further action has been 
taken to address these deficiencies. 
In light of the perceived inadequacies of the CDM safeguards, it would be prudent for the 
CMA and the SDM governing body to adopt a safeguard policy that is significantly more 
protective of human rights than the local stakeholder consultation requirements embedded within 
the CDM rules. Certainly, the CMA and SDM governing body could draw on more comprehensive 
safeguard policies, such as those adopted for REDD+ and the various climate funds (GEF, GCF, 
AF). A complete review of those safeguard policies is beyond the scope of this paper,104 but some 
elements that could be incorporated into the SDM policy include requirements to: 
 consult with affected communities and individuals during project planning, development, 
and implementation; 
 obtain free, prior, and informed consent from any indigenous peoples potentially affected 
by the project; 
 avoid adverse effects on people and the environment and take steps to mitigate any 
unavoidable adverse effects (particularly the displacement of local communities); 
                                                     
101 Schade & Obergassel (2014), supra note 81;  Wolfgang Obergassel et al., Human Rights and 
the Clean Development Mechanism: Lessons Learned from Three Case Studies, 8 Journal of Human Rights 
and the Environment 51 (2017); Human Rights Implications of Climate Change Mitigation Actions, 
(CIDSE, Nature Code, & Carbon Market Watch 2015).  
102 See, e.g., International Rivers, Submission on Views Regarding the Revision of the CDM 
Modalities and Procedures (March 25, 2013), https://perma.cc/HZD9-D7H3; Carbon Market Watch 
Recommendations for CDM Reforms under SBSTA and CMP (July 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/ZB2J-
EJAR;  Carbon Market Watch, Recommendations for the Review of the Modalities and Procedures for the 
Clean Development Mechanism (May 2016), https://perma.cc/2SCB-PK86. 
103 CDM-EB87 meeting report, para. 52 
104  For an overview of safeguard policies for the CDM, REDD+, Green Climate Fund, 
Adaptation Fund, and Global Environment Facility, see Michael Burger and Jessica Wentz, Climate 
Change and Human Rights (UNEP 2014) at 36-39.  
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 engage with the affected community when determining appropriate measures to mitigate 
adverse effects; and 
 periodically monitor and report on compliance with environmental and social safeguards 
(preferably through a third-party). 
In designing an ITMO safeguard policy, the CMA could also refer to the governing 
frameworks for other emission trading schemes that have incorporated requirements aimed at 
ensuring the equitable distribution of benefits and burdens associated with those trading 
schemes.105 One such example is California’s cap and trade program. The 2006 Global Warming 
Solutions Act (AB32), which set the groundwork for the state’s cap and trade program, contained 
broadly worded requirements pertaining to public participation, environmental justice, and the 
equitable distribution of clean energy investments. Specifically, AB 32 provided that: 
“The state board shall ensure that the greenhouse gas emission reduction rules, 
regulations, programs, mechanisms, and incentives under its jurisdiction, where 
applicable and to the extent feasible, direct public and private investment toward 
the most disadvantaged communities in California and provide an opportunity 
for small businesses, schools, affordable housing associations, and other 
community institutions to participate in and benefit from statewide efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”106 
AB 32 also directed the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to convene an Environmental 
Justice Advisory Committee to advise CARB on the development of a scoping plan for 
implementation of these requirements, and specified that the Committee “be comprised of 
representatives from communities in the state with the most significant exposure to air pollution, 
                                                     
105 The “benefits” of trading schemes include, inter alia, the benefits of local air quality 
improvements that correspond with reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and other socio-
economic benefits associated with the transition to clean energy. History has shown that low-
income and minority communities do not always enjoy these benefits in an equitable fashion 
because polluting facilities in their neighborhoods may choose to purchase emission allowances 
rather than actually reducing emissions. Perhaps the most significant “burden” of such trading 
scheme is the potential increase in electricity prices and the corresponding impact on low-income 
households and businesses.  
106 AB32, codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §38565 
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including, but not limited to, communities with minority populations or low-income populations, 
or both.”107 
During the development and subsequent revision of the scoping plan, CARB and the 
Committee held numerous meetings with affected communities in an effort to address 
environmental justice concerns – particularly those pertaining to the distributive effects of cap and 
trade (and the inequitable distribution of both the costs and benefits of the system). 108 Some 
substantive measures that California has taken to address these impacts include: the California 
Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE) program and the Family Electric Rate Assistance (FERA) 
program, under which low-income customers are eligible to receive a rebate or credit on 
residential and small business electricity bills resulting from the sale of allowances under the Cap 
and Trade program.109 California has also passed legislation that sets minimum thresholds for 
investing cap and trade revenue in vulnerable and disadvantaged communities.110  
The CMA could adopt rules or guidance aimed at achieving similar goals. For example, the 
ITMO guidelines could instruct countries participating in ITMO transfers (both hosts and 
recipients) to undertake measures aimed at ensuring full participation of civil society in the 
development of policies pertaining to ITMOs, promoting the equitable distribution of benefits and 
burdens associated with ITMO-generating programs and projects, and mitigating the impacts of 
any additional costs on those who cannot afford them. The Parties to the UNFCCC could also 
potentially adopt rules aimed at channeling a portion of the revenue from ITMOs to vulnerable 
countries for adaptation, but as discussed in greater detail below, such rules would likely fall 
outside of what the Paris Agreement authorizes.111 
                                                     
107 Cal. Health & Safety Code §38591. 
108 CARB, California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan (2017).  
109 Id. at 15. Even with these measures in place, California has received criticism for failing 
to achieve environmental justice goals. See, e.g., Lara Cushing et al., A Preliminary Environmental 
Equity Assessment of California’s Cap and Trade Program (USC Dornsife Program for Environmental 
and Regional Equity 2016). 
110 SB 535 (2012) and AB 1550 (2016). 
111 See infra section 5. 
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3.7 Monitoring and Enforcing Human Rights Safeguards 
The body tasked with overseeing implementation of the SDM could also be charged with 
monitoring and enforcing human rights safeguards established for the SDM. However, given the 
sheer magnitude of potential SDM projects, it is unlikely that a single body could adequately 
monitor and respond to all human rights violations arising from these projects. It would likely be 
necessary to establish one or more subsidiary bodies to deal with compliance or to outsource this 
role to other accredited entities (similar to the DOEs that oversee compliance for CDM projects).112 
Should the CMA also adopt safeguards for ITMOs, it is unclear what body (if any) would 
oversee the implementation of and verify compliance with those safeguards, as the Paris 
Agreement does not designate any governing body for the ITMO framework, and the Parties have 
yet to reach agreement as to whether a body should be established. As discussed above, some 
Parties have also advocated for the SDM supervising body to have oversight over the 
implementation of the ITMO mechanism as well. This would greatly expand the scope of projects 
subject to that body’s supervision and would create an even more compelling need for creating one 
or more subsidiary enforcement bodies and/or outsourcing compliance monitoring and 
verification to accredited third Parties. 
If a centralized body is not established to oversee the use of ITMOs, it will be more difficult 
to ensure that countries and project proponents adhere to any rules pertaining to human rights. In 
that situation, national governments would need to take the lead in ensuring that human rights are 
fully respected and promoted in the context of ITMO-generating programs and projects. 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, and Monaco have proposed one model for national 
certification, specifically that the host country should “provide a confirmation, to be publicly 
available, that the activity is in conformity with sustainable development and human rights when 
authorizing private and/or public entities to participate in cooperating approaches.”113  This would 
provide some measure of accountability, particularly if the host country is required to confirm 
compliance with specific requirements embedded within the safeguards. However, without 
                                                     
112 UNFCCC, Designated Operational Entities, ABOUT CDM, https://perma.cc/2Y6Y-3QJ4. 
113 Submission by Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group on Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/EB52-4YFR. 
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centralized oversight, there would be no formal mechanism for evaluating the accuracy or 
adequacy of these national certifications.  
The Parties could also adopt a “hybrid” approach to ITMO governance, whereby national 
governments are primarily responsible for certifying compliance with standards pertaining to 
human rights and other matters, but a centralized body is tasked with reviewing those 
certifications. The SDM supervising body could play this role. Another approach would be to rely 
on the committee established under Article 15 to evaluate national claims pertaining to ITMOs and 
human rights protections. As noted above, that committee will be generally responsible for 
facilitating implementation and promoting compliance with the agreement and will have the 
authority to monitor national activities and issue warnings to Parties not complying with the rules. 
However, that committee’s mandate is extremely broad and it will most likely be tasked with 
monitoring broader compliance issues (for example, whether Parties are achieving their NDCs).114 
An oversight body charged with a more narrow mandate would probably be better positioned to 
monitor and verify national certifications on human rights matters. 
4. OTHER APPROACHES TO PROTECTING AND PROMOTING 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ARTICLE 6 MECHANISMS 
4.1 Funding Adaptation under the New Article 6 Mechanisms 
Social and environmental safeguards help to prevent human rights violations associated 
with responses to climate change, but they do not necessarily address the effect of climate change 
itself on human rights. The potential for such effects has been recognized by numerous UN bodies, 
including the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR),115 as well as the Parties to the UNFCCC. In the 2010 Cancun Agreements, 
                                                     
114 Susan Biniaz, Elaborating Article 15 of the Paris agreement: Facilitating Implementation and 
Promoting Compliance, IDDRI Policy Brief (Oct. 2017). 
115 See, e.g., UN HRC Res. 7/23, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/7/23 (Mar. 
2008); UN HRC Res. 10/4, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/10/4 (Mar. 25, 2009); 
OHCHR, Report on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights (2009), UN Doc 
A/HRC/10/61; UN HRC Res. 18/22, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/18/22 (Oct. 17, 
2011); UN HRC Res. 26/27, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/26/27 (July 15, 2014); 
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UNFCCC Parties recognized that “climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible 
threat to human societies,” and took notice of the HRC’s findings on climate change and human 
rights.116 The UN Special Procedures Mandates Holders and other UN Agencies have also issued 
numerous reports on this topic.117 Those reports make clear that action will be needed to safeguard 
human rights from infringements associated with the harmful impacts of climate change.  
Certainly, ambitious mitigation measures are needed to mitigate the harmful effects of 
climate change on human rights, and the Article 6 market mechanisms will help to support the 
implementation of such measures. But investments will also be needed to protect vulnerable 
communities and individuals from the adverse impacts of sea level rise, more intense storms, heat 
waves, droughts, and other climate change-related phenomena. Such investments are essential for 
the protection and promotion of human rights in communities that are disproportionately affected 
by climate change. 
Article 6 establishes a mechanism to provide some funding for this purpose. Specifically, 
Article 6.6 specifies that the CMA “shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from activities under 
the [SDM] is used… to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.”118 The SDM funding mechanism 
could benefit from a rights-based approach whereby adaptation funds are channeled to countries 
and communities where climate change poses the greatest risk to human rights. The magnitude of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
UN HRC Res. 29/15, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/29/15 (July 2, 2015); 
OHCHR, Key Messages on Human Rights and Climate Change (2015); UN HRC Res. 32/33, Human 
Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/RES/32/33 (July 18, 2016); UN OHCHR, Analytical Study on 
the Relationship Between Climate Change and the Human Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 45, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/23 (May 
6, 2016); UN OHCHR, The Rights of Those Disproportionately Impacted by Climate Change (30 
September 2016); UN HRC Res. 35/20, A/HRC/35/20 (July 7, 2017) 
116 Decision 1/CP.16 (15 March 2011), UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 2. 
117 See, e.g., A New Climate Change Agreement Must Include Human Rights Protections for All: 
An Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandates Holders to the State Parties to the UNFCCC (Oct. 17, 
2014); Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment: Focus Report on Human Rights and Climate Change (June 2014); Michael 
Burger and Jessica Wentz, Climate Change and Human Rights (UNEP 2014). 
118 Paris Agreement Art. 6.6. 
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the risk to human rights could be gauged based on the threat posed to human lives and health and 
access to fundamental necessities like clean water, food, and housing.  
A number of countries, including the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the 
Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), have advocated for the inclusion of a similar 
adaptation funding provision for ITMO mechanism.119 As noted in a submission by the Maldives 
(on behalf of AOSIS): “The application of these Article 6.4 elements under Article 6.2 would avoid 
disadvantaging the role of Article 6.4 and leverage the utility of these provisions.”120 Channeling 
funds from ITMO revenue to adaptation in vulnerable countries would also help support the goal 
of promoting sustainable development. 
However, Article 6 does not contain any express provision for channeling funds from the 
ITMO mechanism to adaptation efforts in vulnerable countries, which raises the question of 
whether it is permissible. Arguably, the language requiring that ITMOs “promote sustainable 
development” could be interpreted as authorizing such action when read in the context of the 
preamble’s reference to human rights and the U.N.’s many statements on the nexus between 
                                                     
119 Submission by Ethiopia on behalf of the Least Developed Countries Group on Matters 
Relating to Art. 6.2 of the Paris Agreement (Nov. 2017), https://perma.cc/TK77-33G9,  (“A share of 
proceeds from the sale of CAITMOs shall be used to support the Adaptation Fund. The share of 
proceeds shall be X % of issued units."); Submission of views on the content of Article 6.2 guidance 
and Article 6.4 rules, modalities, and procedures, presented by the Republic of the Maldives on 
behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (Nov. 2017), https://perma.cc/V2YE-2NHY (“the 
achievement of an overall mitigation in global emissions and the delivery of a share of proceeds for 
adaptation are features of the 6.4 mechanism, but they could also be features of cooperative 
approaches under Article 6.2, so that Article 6 as a whole contributes to the mitigation and 
adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement. The application of these Article  6.4 elements under 
Article 6.2 would avoid disadvantaging the role of Article 6.4 and leverage the utility of these 
provisions.”): Submission of Ecuador on behalf of the Like Minded Countries on Items Related to 
Article 6 of the UNFCCC’s Paris Agreement (Oct. 19, 2017) at 3, https://perma.cc/KK9N-NQVV 
(“Share of proceeds should also be applied to the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
(ITMOs) in Article 6.2"); Submission by Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Arab Group on Articles 6.2 
and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement (Oct. 18, 2017) at 2, https://perma.cc/2K3X-KY93 (“Share of 
proceeds: Shall apply to both Articles 6.2 and 6.4 and fund adaptation and sustainable 
development for developing country Parties of the Paris Agreement. These shares of proceeds shall 
be allocated to the Adaptation Fund.”). 
120  Submission of views on the content of Article 6.2 guidance and Article 6.4 rules, 
modalities, and procedures, presented by the Republic of the Maldives on behalf of the Alliance of 
Small Island States (Nov. 2017), https://perma.cc/V2YE-2NHY. 
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human rights and sustainable development. 121  However, this interpretation may stretch the 
provisions of Article 6 beyond that which many members of the CMA would view as reasonable 
and politically acceptable. To protect against these risks the UNFCCC Parties might need to enter 
into a new agreement in order to adopt requirements that a portion of ITMO revenue be channeled 
to adaptation funds. That said, the Paris Agreement could easily be interpreted as authorizing soft 
guidelines, recommendations, or incentives aimed at encouraging Parties to channel ITMO 
revenue to adaptation projects in vulnerable countries (for example, as a means of meeting 
obligations or pledges pertaining to financial transfers). Such recommendations could be 
incorporated into the sort of “overarching guidance” on human rights discussed in the following 
section. 
4.2 Overarching Guidelines on Human Rights and Paris Implementation 
Another approach would be to adopt broader guidance on how countries should respect, 
protect, and fulfill human rights as they implement and report on their NDCs. There has already 
been a fair amount of discussion about integrating human rights protections into the broader Paris 
Implementation Guidelines. 122  Thus far, the discussion has centered on integrating those 
protections into provisions pertaining to NDCs, adaptation communications, the transparency 
framework, and the Global Stocktake. For example, the Center for International Environmental 
Law (CIEL) has recommended that the guidelines for NDCs and Adaptation Communications 
should require that these communications: (i) be prepared in a manner that enables the full and 
effective participation by all members of civil society, and (ii) include information on how the 
country is respecting and promoting human rights in both mitigation and adaptation actions.123 In 
addition, CIEL has recommended that the Transparency Framework established under Article 13 
of the Paris agreement should focus not only on accounting for emissions and financial transfers 
but also how Parties fulfill their obligations with respect to human rights in climate-related 
actions.124 Finally, during the Global Stocktake, countries should be evaluated not only on the basis 
                                                     
121 See, e.g., UN OHCHR, supra note 7. 
122 See, e.g., Sébastien Duyck et al., Delivering on the Paris Promises: Combating Climate Change 
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123 Id. at 13-15. 
124 Id. at 16. 
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of their quantitative achievements (e.g., emission reductions) but also the extent to which they 
have respected human rights and promoted sustainable development through climate action.125 
Overarching guidelines of this sort could be used to facilitate reporting on and assessment 
of how countries respect human rights in the context of the Article 6 market mechanisms. 
However, they may not provide the same level of protection as more targeted rules. The most 
protective approach would be to combine these overarching guidelines with specific safeguards 
for the SDM and possibly ITMOs.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The Parties to the Paris Agreement have acknowledged that they should “respect, promote, 
and consider their respective obligations on human rights” when taking action to address climate 
change.126 However, the Paris Agreement does not impose any specific requirements pertaining to 
the protection of human rights in the context of mitigation and adaptation actions. This paper 
explores the critical question of whether and to what extent the Parties can adopt rules aimed at 
safeguarding human rights in the context of the Article 6 ITMO and SDM frameworks. We find 
that there are several possible approaches: 
(i) The adoption of social and environmental safeguards for the SDM and ITMO 
frameworks that resemble (but ideally improve upon) the types of safeguards adopted 
for the CDM and other project finance mechanisms. 
(ii) The establishment of guidelines aimed at ensuring that a portion of the revenue from 
the SDM, and perhaps the ITMO framework, is channeled to countries and 
communities where climate change poses the greatest risk to human rights. 
(iii) The incorporation of human rights considerations into the overarching implementation 
guidelines for the Paris Agreement. 
None of these measures is explicitly required by the Paris Agreement. 127 However, as 
detailed above, implicit authorization for such measures can be found in the language in the 
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preamble calling upon Parties to respect, promote, and consider human rights when acting on 
climate change. Further support for options (i) and (ii) is also found in the text and structure of 
Article 6. Perhaps the most compelling textual justification in Article 6 is the requirement that both 
the ITMO mechanism and SDM “promote sustainable development.” This language must be 
interpreted in the context of the broader recognition that the protection of human rights is an 
essential element of sustainable development.  
The Paris Agreement could also be interpreted as leaving matters pertaining to the 
protection of human rights to the discretion of individual Parties. But history has shown that 
national authorities may lack the incentives and/or resources to safeguard human rights in the 
context of mitigation actions financed or facilitated through UNFCCC market-based mechanisms 
like the CDM. The adoption of binding rules accompanied by centralized oversight and 
enforcement would be the most effective way to protect and promote human rights in the 
implementation of ITMOs and the SDM. 
